Abstract: This sui generis case unmasks the deficiencies of a 'constitution of the oceans' that fails to provide an equal framework to support the single unity of archipelagos and therefore safeguard their economic, security and environmental interests. Certainly, archipelagos were not prominently featured in the traditional forums for Law of the Sea issues, as they were usually overshadowed by more 'urgent' matters. In light of the exclusion of mid-ocean archipelagos of mainland states from the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS, this article undertakes the challenge of providing a legal answer to justify the practice of the straight baseline method to enclose waters surrounding the Galapagos Islands. It evaluates the negotiation process of the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS, and suggests that the Ecuadorian claim cannot be sustained under Part IV. Article 7 UNCLOS and the Fisheries Case are both addressed as alternatives, since they provide a possible legal foundation for the claim. Nonetheless, it is the special circumstances surrounding the Galapagos that sustains the Ecuadorian claim; the immemorial exercise of jurisdiction over the waters of the archipelago, the tolerance of neighbouring states, and the countless declarations from international bodies which provide a basis for a valid historic title.
In light of the unreasonable exclusion of mid-ocean archipelagos of mainland states from the archipelagic regime of the 1982 Convention, this work undertakes the challenge of providing an alternative legal solution for the regulation of mid-ocean archipelagos of mainland states, and more concretely to justify the practice surrounding the Galapagos Islands. It will address the rationale behind the archipelagic claims, their similarities and departures from the archipelagic scenarios that law has covered, with a special but not exclusive emphasis on UNCLOS, in contrast to the relevant rules of customary international law.
Section B aims to insert the reader into the negotiation process that preceded the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS and demonstrate that the debate (to the extent that any occurred) lacked technical and academic insight, and thus resulted in an only partial recognition of the archipelagic claim. It is followed by an analysis of Part IV of UNCLOS to resolve, in a first step, the applicability of this regime to dependent archipelagos.
In the search for a legal basis to justify the omission of UNCLOS, section C deals with the different types of archipelagos recognised by law from an analysis of the transversal features common in every regime: straight baselines and enclosed waters. A detailed analysis of their legal status and the manner in which dependent archipelagos have implemented these elements will show parallelisms in the sense that they all seem to find legal support beyond article 7 of UNCLOS itself, but also in the very origins of the baseline concept established in the Fisheries Case. 3 Whether this practice is sufficiently uniform to consolidate into a customary rule demands a more detailed study. Nonetheless, it sets the basis for the Galapagos case, which will be addressed as a final discussion of this article.
Section D provides an overview of the very particular circumstances that surround the Ecuadorian claim and how the effective and immemorial exercise of jurisdiction over the waters of the Archipelago sets the basis for its validity in international customary law, in the absence of an express provision in the oft-praised 'constitution of the oceans'; a great framework currently challenged by the need to evolve for the benefit of governance of the oceans.
B. ARCHIPELAGOS AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA The wide scope of complex issues to be addressed in the Third Conference and the need to reach an effective legal agreement called for a unique and skillful deliberation process, 7 from which Tanaka has identified five major characteristics: consensus, the package-deal approach, informal meetings, the single-text approach and the group approach; the latter of particular importance for this work. 8 Unofficially, Member States of the United Nations have been categorised in Regional
The breaking point of traditional claims: a necessary background
Groups, a system that often operates in international relations, diplomacy and multilateral forums, including the UNCLOS III. 9 However, their influence in this Conference was limited to a secondary role due to the diversity of views and positions of its members over substantive matters, which naturally evolved in the emergence of the so-called New Special
Interest Groups. 10 The common denominator of a shared interest turned the Groups into a highly influential force that succeeded in developing a common agenda through a wellorganised structure, and regular and often informal meetings.
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The Group of Archipelagic States, integrated by Indonesia, the Philippines, Mauritius and Fiji, led the discussion in favor of a special regime. Their active participation was essential in the law-making process and in drafting Part IV of UNCLOS. In fact, they put forward a number of documents and informal working papers that set the basis for an intense negotiation process.
Among these contributions, the Draft Articles Relating to Archipelagic States is often mentioned as a well-accepted document that reconciled the views of navigating states with 4 Nordquist (n 1) 3. 5 the sponsors' interests. 12 However, little is said about the amendments that this text included in comparison with a previous proposal presented to the Sea-Bed Committee.
13
More specifically, the crucial replacement of the word 'mainly' for 'wholly' in article 1, which produced a provision in the following terms: 'An archipelagic State is a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands'. This small change with huge implications suggests an intention to deliberately exclude outlying dependent archipelagos from the envisaged archipelagic regime of the emerging UNCLOS, a view expressed by the Indonesian delegation.
14 This amendment generated a parallel debate against a diverse group of states, which supported the indivisible nature of archipelagos and rightfully contended that the nonrecognition of a similar reality would turn archipelagos belonging to a mixed State into a 'second class territory', 15 unable to benefit from an adequate regime to protect their interests to the same extent that archipelagic states could. 24 The latter started these claims once they gained independence from their colonial powers, whose attention was naturally focused in maintaining the freedom of navigation on the high seas
Part IV: the narrow aftermath of a magnificent Convention
For the purpose of determining an archipelagic regime, states needed to agree on a formula to define the term 'archipelago' and set the basis for the applicable rules. In the simplest form, they are a 'group of islands' or 'a sea stretch of water containing many islands' according to the Oxford Dictionary; no source provides further detail in respect of the nature of their elements, their size, number and other technical considerations.
Although the legal connotations of an archipelagic concept was not a priority in the early discussions of the law of the sea, it was a matter of study for a number of authors.
Hodgson and Alexander, in their Occasional Paper for the Law of the Sea Institute, stated that archipelagos are 'an example of special circumstances'. 25 In previous years, Evensen had already contributed with a groundbreaking piece of work that accurately described the different situations in which these formations could be found, and highlighted the complexities of constructing a geo-juridical definition. territory does not satisfy the quantitative requirements has the option to divide its group of islands into more than one archipelago, each with its own straight baselines regime. Although this enables it to benefit from the archipelagic regime of Part IV, the very elements of unity and integration of its territory are disregarded due to a strictly legal consideration.
41
Since UNCLOS III followed a different pattern from its predecessors and did not rely on the previous work of the ILC, 42 its outcome mainly responds to political rather than strictly academic considerations. 43 Regrettably, it missed the opportunity to legally cover all types of archipelagos under a single, coherent and clear regime as it does not make any express reference to mid-ocean or coastal archipelagos. The latter, although in practice covered by the provisions on straight baselines, 44 cannot be strictly equated to a 'fringe of islands' in the terms of article 7 of the UNCLOS, as stated by Kopela. This is mainly so because an archipelago implies a close interaction between the islands it comprises, while a fringe of islands is only required to have a close relation and vicinity with the nearby coast and its waters, as pointed out in the 1951 Fisheries Case. 45 Nonetheless, the main difference between coastal and mid-ocean archipelagos responds solely to geographic considerations, but both certainly share the same economic, political and historic identity inherent in archipelagos, which are compelling reasons why they ought to have been addressed equally in Part IV for the sake of a uniform system. 40 ibid 109. 41 ibid 110. 42 Koh and Jayakumar (n 7) 29 43 Summary records (n 13) intervention of Mr Tolentino (Philippines) 265. 44 Churchill and Lowe (n 3) 120. 45 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) (n 3); Kopela (n 24) 71.
C. COASTAL ARCHIPELAGOS, ARCHIPELAGIC STATES AND MID-OCEAN ARCHIPELAGOS OF NON-ARCHIPELAGIC STATES: LEGAL STATUS OF BASELINES AND ENCLOSED WATERS
Despite a special archipelagic regime in UNCLOS, this instrument failed to address all types of archipelagos under a uniform system. While coastal archipelagos are legitimated on the basis of article 4(1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention and article 7(1) of the UNCLOS, archipelagic states find their legal support in Part IV of UNCLOS. On the contrary, the lack of a specific provision for mid-ocean dependent archipelagos has not impeded mainland states from proceeding with an analogous practice and connecting their insular features with straight baselines and claiming a special regime in the enclosed waters.
There are different types of archipelagos, each of which forms the subject of diverse and substantial State practice. However, the protection sought by states and the one provided by law can be simplified in the unification of the insular features by the use of straight baselines, over which enclosed waters the State exercises sovereignty. Precisely, baselines and enclosed waters are the elements that persuade states to identify a 'fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity' as a coastal archipelago, or to claim the status of archipelagic State. They are highly motivated by the exercise of sovereignty over the enclosed waters.
Baselines
Their importance is functional, as they constitute the starting point to measure the different maritime zones, to delimit overlapping areas with neighbouring states, and hence to determine the applicable regime and the extent of the rights and duties to be exercised by the coastal State over each maritime space.
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As a reminder, international law has identified two types of baselines: the low-water line, referred in both the Geneva Convention and the UNCLOS as 'normal baseline'; and the artificial straight baselines, for which the applicable provisions are comprised in article 4 of the Geneva Convention and article 7 of the UNCLOS.
The first method is the line that follows the sinuosities of the coast, a simple formula that has barely represented any conflict, misinterpretation or abuse by coastal states.
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International law has granted a discretionary power to states regarding this matter, which are Moreover, under Part VIII of UNCLOS, islands have been recognised with the same maritime spaces applicable to land territory, and the normal baseline is implied to be the method to start measuring these zones. Before a Convention that has no express provision to address the situation of dependent archipelagos, this appears to be the only valid drawing in the eyes of states that oppose the inclusion of dependent archipelagos under the protection of a straight baseline system, such as the United States, which has implemented this system to delimit the Hawaiian Islands. This is also supported by the fact that the normal baseline has long been argued to be the general rule, as it showed to be the preferred method in early codification forums such as In its pleadings, Norway repeatedly stressed the fact that its geographic peculiarities called for a different regime than the low-water mark. The ICJ responded positively to this claim by concluding that in these circumstances 'the line of the low-water mark can no longer be put forward as a rule requiring the coastline to be followed in all its sinuosities'. 51 It added that such a rugged coast would require countless derogations that the rule would disappear.
Hence, such a coast called for the application of a reasonable but different method, one that departs from the physical line of the coast. 60 For the purpose of this study, the lack of univocal content of these norms constitutes a weakness in the system that could potentially uphold the application of straight baselines in mid-ocean archipelagos of mainland states.
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In contrast, article 47 displays a set of objective rules, two of them with a clear numerical approach (water-land ratio and maximum length of the baselines), that aim to prevent arbitrariness of archipelagic states.
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Regarding the water-land ratio, article 47(1) has established that it shall be 'between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1'. drawing archipelagic straight baselines, because the lower ratio excludes archipelagos 'dominated by one or two large islands or islands that are connected only by comparatively small sea areas'. 63 However, they could consider their surrounding islands as though they were coastal archipelagos along a mainland coast, and therefore 'tie them to the main island' by straight baselines. 64 On the other hand, the upper ratio excludes archipelagos which are integrated by dispersed islands, such as Tuvalu and Kiribati. 65 As for their length, article 47(2) provides a maximum of 100 nautical miles and, exceptionally, 125 miles. This is clearly different than the provisions in article 4 of the Geneva Convention and 7 of UNCLOS, where no limit has been established. 
Enclosed waters
Their legal status and applicable regime varies according to the nature of the baselines surrounding them. In other words, under Part IV of UNCLOS, the archipelagic State has been granted sovereignty over the enclosed waters and its resources as a concession to secure a number of rights in favour of navigating states. Conversely, the waters on the landward side of the straight baselines drawn according to articles 4 of the Geneva Convention and 7 of UNCLOS, are internal waters, thus subject to less constraints than those recognised as archipelagic.
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In the first scenario, states are allowed to exercise sovereignty over the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, their bed, subsoil and corresponding air space 68 in a similar regime as that of the territorial sea, in the sense that there is recognition of navigational rights. 69 These rights comprise innocent passage for ships of all states, in accordance to the rules prescribed in Part II for the territorial sea; and archipelagic sea lanes passage. If an archipelagic state decides to implement these routes, due publicity must be given to the axis of the sea lanes and the respective traffic separation schemes to ensure the safe passage of ships. 70 However, archipelagic states are not obliged to establish such sea lanes, 71 in which case the right to transit through the routes normally used for international navigation remains valid (article 53(12)). Likewise, it seems that there is no obligation for ships to use the designated sea lanes either, as Brown alleges; in which case, they will not benefit from this right as it allows, for example, navigation 'in the normal mode' (article 53(3)).
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In relation to internal waters, they can result from the application of straight baselines to link coastal archipelagos to the mainland, according to Part II of UNCLOS, or under Part VII, when the archipelagic State delimits internal waters within its archipelagic waters. In both scenarios, sovereignty over this space is not subject to any obligations towards third states (contrary to the territorial sea regime). However, as a matter of customary international law, it might be argued that there is a right of access to ports, 73 as well as innocent passage where the straight baseline has enclosed waters that were not previously considered as such.
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Although the regime of archipelagic waters shares some similarities with that of the territorial sea, it was included in UNCLOS as a sui generis category subject to a wider set of exceptions, in order to balance the interests of navigating and archipelagic states. As Morgan describes: 'the archipelagic regime is more of a second cousin to the territorial sea than an identical twin'. 75 Without going any further, this essay requires a clear understanding of both regimes in order to sustain the Galapagos claim. For this reason, it will be briefly concluded that the enclosed waters of coastal archipelagos seem to be well established in international law as internal waters, through conventional and customary rules. 76 As for the legal status of archipelagic waters, they appear to have become part of customary international law, as well. 77 Despite the fact that the rules on passage through archipelagic waters were developed as part of an entirely new concept in UNCLOS, consensus, State practice, and the fact that the rules of passage through the territorial sea are well established as custom, have proved that this regime has indeed passed into the body of customary law. 
D. THE GALAPAGOS ISLANDS: THE VALID CLAIM OF A SUI GENERIS CASE

Setting the basis
The islands are located at a distance of 972 km off the west of the Ecuadorian coast, in the Pacific Ocean. Also, known as Archipiélago de Colón, is one of the 24 provinces of the Republic of Ecuador, to which they appertain since 1832, when they were annexed by its first president.
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The archipelago encompasses 5 main islands with an area that exceeds 500 km Convention was the rule governing the seas. Despite Ecuador not being a State party to the Geneva Convention, the fact that this instrument did not exactly prohibit the application of straight baselines to enclose a group of islands, suggests that it did not constitute an unlawful practice under general international law. Moreover, the provisions concerning straight baselines find their legal basis in the Fisheries Case. This judgment has not only influenced further State practice, but has found continuity in both the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, besides providing the very basis for the archipelagic states regime during the UNCOS III.
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As such, the implementation of straight baselines to enclose mid-ocean dependent archipelagos has been suggested to be valid under international law if analogously applied to the ICJ Judgment. 123 Although an interesting contribution, I must argue that the dissimilarities between coastal and oceanic archipelagos outweigh any resemblance between these archipelagos and thus any potential attempt to apply these criteria to the Galapagos.
Nevertheless, the Fisheries Case should not be entirely dismissed, as it brought an equally important element into consideration, one that could effectively sustain the Galapagos case:
historic waters.
As for straight baselines, the ICJ Judgement is indeed broad in some of its content and provides a subjective approach to the matter by avoiding any mathematical guidance, 124 to the point that a significant number of states have relied on these criteria, despite a reiterative protest of vigilant states such as the US. 125 A superficial reading of this Judgment leads to the conclusion that as long as the coastal State reasonably complies with the ICJ considerations, the drawing of straight baselines are deemed to be valid under international law, regardless of their length.
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This argument is partially correct, to the extent that it is applied around a fringe or group of islands at a relatively close distance from the coastline. As far as mid-ocean archipelagos are concerned, this analogy is challenging and hard to sustain, starting from the fact that the case submitted before the ICJ was not concerned with off-shore archipelagos in the first place. 127 Although there is no objective provision to determine the exact distance the islands must be located from the coastline, it must be recalled that the Court relied on the fact that that the Norwegian coast was fringed by these islands, in a manner that they bordered a majority of the coastline simulating a masking effect. straight baselines in analogy to coastal archipelagos in the Fisheries Case, and in application of article 4(1) of the Geneva Convention and article 7(1) of UNCLOS, is not an appropriate option for Ecuador.
Finally, there is some quite interesting reasoning underpinning the ICJ Judgment, as it is the land domain that 'confers upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its coasts '. 129 This is the key point that prevents mid-ocean archipelagos being equated to coastal archipelagos: the dominance of the coastline over the sea, the immediate distance that subordinates islands and waters to the land domain. 130 This differs from mid-ocean archipelagos, where there is no dominant coastline as a point of reference, but rather a waterbased analysis; 131 which arguably can sustain the Galapagos claim and which should focus on historic, immemorial, long-standing considerations of Ecuador over the waters that it has enclosed and use them as a starting point to explain the implementation of a straight baseline method as the only logical drawing method to safeguard their interests.
b) Historic title over waters
Ecuador has traditionally considered the enclosed waters of the Galapagos as internal, suggesting on a narrow first view that it does not comply with the rights accommodated for third states in Part IV of UNCLOS. While it is correct that any limitation to the sovereignty of a State has to clearly emanate from a rule of international law as it cannot be presumed, in accordance with the PCIJ decision in the Lotus case, 132 it is also incorrect to affirm that Ecuador does not comply with international law on the basis of the UNCLOS framework, as this work argues that it has no intention to validate its practice under these provisions in the first place.
Likewise, 'a State may not plead its municipal law as a defense to avoid its obligations under international law', 133 thus the freedom of navigation and other related rights cannot be impeded in archipelagic waters through national legislation. Again, this is inapplicable to the Galapagos, because Ecuador does not base its claim in the terms of Part IV. Hence, it is not under an obligation to designate sea lanes passage and any other right prescribed in UNCLOS. The Ecuadorian practice must be validated from its immemorial and unequivocal consideration of the Galapagos as a single geographic, territorial and political unity, whose enclosed waters have traditionally been treated as internal. 134 In this regard, the specific scope and terms for the acquisition of historic waters have not been expressly prescribed in any of the law of the sea conventions. However, their nature has been recognised in customary international law through State practice 135 and judicial decisions, 136 where they have been acknowledged as an enlargement of the notion of historic bays on historic grounds. 137 Moreover, as a legal status that is not strictly limited to apply to bays, but one that can be equally extended to other maritime areas 'where there is at least some evidence of geographical enclosure or connection with the adjacent landmass'; such is the case of archipelagos.
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As the historic title constitutes the starting point for historic waters, which would not be considered as internal in the absence of it, it also constitutes a derogation of the rules of international law in force. 139 In other words, and leaving aside the fact that Ecuador does not justify its position under the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS, the sovereignty that it has exercised over the enclosed waters of the Galapagos does not contravene international law as it has relied on a historic title. Hence, it has complete sovereignty over this space and is under no legal obligation to concede navigational rights, whether it is innocent or archipelagic sea lanes passage, 140 or freedom of fishing and any other activity permitted in a high seas regime.
In this regard, it should be noted that the Ecuadorian practice constitutes a claim for historic waters, and not a plea to acquire jurisdictional historic rights over them. In this regard, the early recognition of the Galapagos as a single unity in the Ecuadorian legislation has allowed it to extend all the State machinery to protect this area.
Aware that the Galapagos could not possibly survive without the effective protection of the marine ecosystem that surrounds the islands, it enacted legislation according to which it is entitled to exercise full jurisdiction and sovereignty over the enclosed waters of the archipelago. foreign vessels in the Galapagos waters, which are not only required to have prior authorisation, but are completely banned to transit in the Area to be avoided.
As for the temporal requirement, the Ecuadorian practice has been continuous for an extended and uninterrupted period; and although it has demonstrated to be long (the 1934
Decree already considered the Islands as a single unity), 154 it has also been substantial in light of the enforcement measures taken to limit third states' rights. 155 Publicity is often mentioned as an important feature of historic waters, 156 and in this respect the Ecuadorian practice is far from being hidden as it has been embodied in domestic legislation (from a wide set of decrees, special law and constitutional provisions) as well as in the international forum (through the many declarations of notorious international bodies and organisations). Thus, any third State objections asserting a lack of awareness of the existence of the enclosed waters regime of the Galapagos would be highly questionable.
In connection with this matter, 157 the response of third states is of great importance concerning the acknowledgement of the existence of a claim to internal waters, especially if this claim were to be contrary to international law when it was first asserted. 158 by it. Hence, the need to address this subject from an inter-state perspective, and their specific responses to it, either protest or acquiescence. Despite the success of negotiations with neighbouring states, the Galapagos delimitation system has been protested by the US on different occasions, when it has mainly challenged the use of straight baselines to measure the territorial sea, instead of the low-water mark around each island. 166 Without any further discussion, this protest has lost relevance given the constant role of the US as a persistent objector to countless maritime claims, and Applying these considerations, the use of straight baselines to enclose the Galapagos is more than justified as the best available method to protect this exceptional environment.
Simultaneously, it represents a valuable tool for Ecuador, through which it can regulate countless activities that could not be controlled if this area was under a high seas regime. 170 Furthermore, studies demonstrate that the difference between measuring the territorial sea from straight baselines around an archipelago and around each island individually, does not represent a considerable gain in terms of area. 171 Therefore, the result of enclosing a group of islands under a straight baseline system versus the low-water mark is basically that the outer perimeter of the maritime zones is a geographic line instead of curves, which is also more convenient for navigational purposes because they are easier to ascertain in charts. 172 Again, there is no major impact to the sea area, but the gain is immense in terms of environmental protection and enhanced security, especially because pirates and smugglers do not differentiate an archipelagic State from a dependent archipelago to execute their illegal activities, and maritime accidents and vessel collisions are not planned in advance.
E. CONCLUSION
Whereas the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS may be considered unreasonable in light of its highly political negotiation, this in no way undermines the fact that it still constitutes a rule of law. To the extent that the 1982 Convention is a treaty, it is also one of the formal sources of rights and obligations in international law. The fact that it was envisioned to codify established rules of customary law and crystallise emergent norms does not mean that this framework has the last word in the law of the sea field either, or that it is not subject to evolve according to contemporary needs.
Moreover, the great acceptance of the Convention does not necessarily imply that all of its provisions have equally become part of customary international law, 174 And in the case of outlying dependent archipelagos, that further State practice is banned from occuring in a parallel way, without being accused of unlawfulness.
This is certainly the case in regards mainland states and their practice of enclosing their outlying islands under a straight baseline system, over which enclosed waters they exercise jurisdiction and sovereignty. While a number of detailed studies suggest that this praxis is still far from being uniform and evolve into a norm of custom in international law, 175 it is also true that this possibility should not be entirely dismissed. Especially when the tension around these claims are -to say the least-expected when the rules governing baselines are manifestly vague in their content.
This work evidences how a singular case, allegedly not covered by the legal machinery of UNCLOS, can share the same spirit and urgency as those expressly protected by this instrument. It shows how an 'illegal' practice has not only been tolerated by a great number of states, but also protected by the international community under countless declarations and special regimes. This broad acceptance not only legitimises the Galapagos claim but it also unmasks the deficiencies of the modern law of the sea.
The 1982 Convention intended to limit the application of the archipelagic regime to
State archipelagos on the grounds of statehood. Ironically, the international community now faces a greater challenge than the one of proliferation of claims that it feared during the UNCLOS III negotiations. The possible evolution of the practice of outlying dependent archipelagos into a norm of custom could create a bizarre parallel system, one even more beneficial than Part IV, one where navigational rights and similar concessions are not included for third parties.
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As for the Galapagos, Ecuador has acted in the firm belief that its practice is coherent with international law, and there is enough material to demonstrate that it has been consistently performed for a long period of time.
However, the possession of a historic title over waters does not constitute a malicious appropriation of territory, but rather a legitimate claim that also entails a number of obligations for the Ecuadorian State, a small developing country which is also responsible of exercising effective control over the waters under its jurisdiction. Hence, the reading in the Galapagos case (and archipelagos in general) should adopt a water-based approach, rather than one relying on a straight baseline method. To this end, if archipelagos consist of 'a sea or stretch of water having many islands', then the only viable method to enclose these features and preserve their unity is a straight baseline system. A drawing that has been traditionally stigmatised as it appears to carry expansionist intentions, a belief that the Galapagos case hopes to prove wrong.
Finally, archipelagos are generally vulnerable and demand to be protected under the law. Before a silent UNCLOS and a decentralised international law system, the logical response would be to allow State practice to continue taking its course and consolidate as a rule of international law. A rule that so far demonstrates to have no intention to modify the 1982 Convention or contravene its spirit, but rather complement its provisions now that time has evidenced them reasonable for modern needs. 
